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Abstract—The Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising
hardware security primitive because of its inherent uniqueness and low
cost. To extract the device-specific variation from delay-based strong
PUFs, complex routing constraints are imposed to achieve symmetric
path delays; and systematic variations can severely compromise the
uniqueness of the PUF. In addition, the metastability of the arbiter circuit
of an Arbiter PUF can also degrade the quality of the PUF due to the
induced instability. In this paper we propose a novel strong UNBIAS
PUF that can be implemented purely by Register Transfer Language
(RTL), such as verilog, without imposing any physical design constraints
or delay characterization effort to solve the aforementioned issues.
Efficient inspection bit prediction models for unbiased response extraction
are proposed and validated. Our experimental results of the strong
UNBIAS PUF show 5.9% intra-Fractional Hamming Distance (FHD)
and 45.1% inter-FHD on 7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
boards without applying any physical layout constraints or additional
XOR gates. The UNBIAS PUF is also scalable because no characterization
cost is required for each challenge to compensate the implementation bias.
The averaged intra-FHD measured at worst temperature and voltage
variation conditions is 12%, which is still below the margin of practical
Error Correction Code (ECC) with error reduction techniques for PUFs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware security has become an important aspect in modern
Integrated Circuit (IC) design industry because of the global supply
chain business model. Identifying and authenticating each fabricated
components of a chip is a challenging task [1]. A Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) has been a promising security primitive such that its
behavior, or Challenge Response Pair (CRP) [2], is uniquely defined
and is hard to predict or replicate. A PUF can enable low overhead
hardware identification, tracing, and authentication during the global
manufacturing chain.
Silicon delay based strong PUFs have been studied intensively
since its first appearance in [3] because of its low implementation
cost and large CRP space compared with a weak PUF [4]. However,
there are still design challenges that restrain a strong PUF from
being put in a widespread practical use. One of the major design
challenges for a silicon delay based PUF is the strict symmetric delay
path layout requirement. The wire delays of the competing paths
should be designed and matched carefully to avoid biased responses,
otherwise low inter-chip uniqueness would make the PUF unusable
[5, 6]. In addition to asymmetric routing, another source of the biased
responses for silicon based PUF is the systematic process variation,
which can also degrade the quality of a PUF, such as uniqueness or
unpredictability. Finally, the metastability issue of the arbiter circuit
for an Arbiter PUF can cause unstable PUF responses, making a
portion of the CRP unusable due to their instabilities [7].
A. Asymmetric Path Delay Routing
For a delay based PUF, the randomness should be contributed
only by the subtle variations between devices, so having biased delay
differences due to asymmetric routing is detrimental to delay based
PUFs, and such impact should be eliminated. However, a precise
control of the routing can be a difficult and time consuming task.
An implementation of an Arbiter PUF on Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) is considered much more difficult than a RO PUF
because the connections to the arbiter circuit must also be symmetric
[8], and performing completely symmetric routing is physically
infeasible in most cases [6], resulting small inter-Fractional Hamming
Distance (FHD) for an Arbiter PUF [9]. One of the most common
solutions to the asymmetric routing is to use hard-macros in FPGA
designs [10, 11], but it is not effective with Arbiter PUF, and some
less commonly-used features of the FPGA would be required [12].
Other approaches try to extract randomness by XORing the outputs
of multiple Arbiter PUFs at the cost of large hardware overhead and
less stability [13]. In [14], the authors proposed using ‘middle’ bits
instead of the Most Significant Bit (MSB) as the RO PUF response
measurement. The measurement can effectively eliminate the biased
responses, but an efficient way of predicting the inspection bit is not
described, and the presented RO PUF is not a strong PUF. A RTL-
based PUF bit generation unit was proposed in [15], but to the best
of our knowledge, a strong PUF that can be implemented efficiently
without any layout constraints has not yet been proposed.
B. Systematic Process Variation
The existence of systematic process variation can degrade the
quality of silicon based PUFs because the local randomness should
be the only desired entropy source of the delay based PUF [16].
The effect of systematic process variation is similar to having biased
wire delay between two delay paths, which can also damage the
uniqueness of the PUF. Another possible vulnerability caused by
systematic variation is the induced process side channel attack as
described in [17]. Due to intra-wafer systematic variation [18], PUFs
fabricated at the same region on different wafers can have similar
systematic behavior, which can be exploited as a process side channel
attack.
To account for systematic variations, a compensation technique is
proposed in [10], which requires careful design decisions to compare
RO pairs that are physically placed close to each other. In [16],
the systematic variation is modeled and subtracted from the PUF
response to distill true randomness with the cost of model calculation.
Similarly, in [19], the averaged RO frequency is subtracted from the
original frequency, where the multiple measurements of each RO can
lead to large latency overhead. In [20], a method is proposed to extract
local random process variation from total variation, however, a second
order difference calculation is needed, and hard-macro technique
must be applied to construct symmetric delay paths.
C. Metastability of the Arbiter Circuit
The idea of an Arbiter PUF is to introduce a race condition on
two paths and an arbiter circuit is used to decide which one of the
two paths reached first. The arbiter circuit is usually a D flip-flop or
a SR latch. If two signals arrive at an arbiter within a short time,
the arbiter circuit may enter a metastable state due to setup time
violation [21]. Once the arbiter circuit is in metastable state, the
response becomes unstable. To eliminate the inconsistency caused
by metastability of the arbiter circuit, existing approaches use the
majority vote or to choose the paths that have a delay difference larger
than the metastable window δ at the cost of CRP characterization and
discarding the unstable CRPs [7].
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D. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose the physical implementation bias agnostic
(UNBIAS) PUF that is immune to physical implementation bias. The
contributions of this paper include:
• We proposed the first strong UNBIAS PUF that can be imple-
mented purely by RTL without imposing any physical routing
constraints.
• Efficient inspection bit selection strategy based on intra-/inter-
FHD prediction models are proposed and verified on the strong
UNBIAS PUF.
II. PROPOSED STRONG UNBIAS PUF
The proposed strong UNBIAS PUF compares two delay paths to
generate PUF responses. Similar to Arbiter PUF, each bit of the
challenge of the UNBIAS PUF specifies the path configuration of the
delay path. As shown in Figure 1, the challenge c1 and c2 specify
the path configurations, and an one-bit response is extracted from
the difference register, which can be of several bits long. Once a
challenge is given, a signal is applied at Trigger. Each of the Clock
counter begins to count the number of clock cycles of the system
clock (CLK) whenever the the signal from Trigger is propagated to
the START input of the counter, and stops counting whenever the the
signal from Trigger is propagated to the STOP input of the counter.
For each challenge, the difference value of the two Clock counters is
stored in the difference register for further response extraction, which
is described in details in Section III.
Fig. 1. The proposed strong UNBIAS PUF. The Clock counter starts counting
clock cycles of the system clock (CLK) when START arrives and stops when
STOP arrives. The difference of two Clock counters are stored in the difference
register for further response extraction.
The purpose of the ROs inserted between path configurations is to
increase the path delay so that it will take multiple clock cycles for
the signal to propagate to stop the clock counter. As shown in Figure
2, each RO is associated with a RO counter that counts the number
of oscillations of the RO. The RO counter starts counting when the
signal from its previous path configuration is arrived, and propagates
the signal to the next path configuration only when the count reaches
a certain threshold. All the ROs are composed of same number of
inverters and neither configurations nor any layout constraints are
needed.
Unlike the conventional Arbiter PUF, the strong UNBIAS PUF has
no metastability issues caused by a D flip-flop or a latch. The delay
difference of the two paths is transformed into counter values of the
system clock. By judiciously extracting the response from the dif-
ference register, the physical implementation bias can be effectively
mitigated, therefore the UNBIAS PUF can be implemented purely by
RTL without any routing or layout constraints. Details of the response
extraction are described in Section III.
III. BIAS-IMMUNE RESPONSE EXTRACTION
A. Inspection Bit on Unbiased/Biased Paths
In this section we describe how different selections of the in-
spection bit can change the intra- and inter-FHD. Figure 3 shows
an example of a distribution of values from difference registers of
Fig. 2. ROs are inserted between path configurations to increase the path delay
for better stability. The signal from previous path configuration is propagated
only when the count of the RO counter reaches a certain threshold.
symmetrically routed UNBIAS PUFs. The length of the difference
register is 22-bit, so the range of the register value is between −221
and 221 − 1 as represented in 2’s-complement. The large inter-chip
measurement curve gives the distribution of the values across all
PUFs. Since the PUF is unbiased, roughly half of the difference
values would be greater than zero due to random local process
variation, therefore the inter-FHD of the UNBIAS PUFs would be
close to 50%. In this case, the inspection bit is simply the MSB,
which divides the range of 22-bit difference value into two groups
bin 1 and bin 0. All measurements fall into bin 1 on the left output
a 1; others output a 0. The small intra-chip measurement curve gives
the distribution of multiple measurements of the PUF on a same
chip. Due to noise, the difference values could be different, so the
intra-FHD of the difference register may not be a perfect 0%.
Fig. 3. For a symmetrically routed PUF, the inter-FHD would be close to
50%. The intra-FHD may not be zero due to measurement noise.
Even though symmetric UNBIAS PUF layout is much preferred,
it is difficult and takes much effort and overhead to achieve such
requirement as described in Section I-A. In practice, if no layout con-
straints are imposed, the measurement distribution of the difference
register can be as shown in Figure 4, where most of the difference
values across chips are greater than zero. In this case, using the MSB
as the inspection bit would cause low inter-FHD of the PUFs because
most MSBs are 0’s.
Fig. 4. For a biased PUF, most of the difference values across all chips could
be greater than zero, causing a low inter-FHD if the MSB is the inspection
bit.
For the same biased distribution shown in Figure 4, if the ith bit is
used as the inspection bit of the difference register as Figure 5 shows,
the range of the 22-bit difference value is divided into multiple bins
with width 2i, where the output of the measurement is decided by
the bin in which it resides. Note that in this case the response is
not an indicator of which delay is longer in the comparison. The
smaller the width of the bin is, the closer the inter-FHD is to 50%
because roughly half of the outputs would reside in bin 1 even with
biased delay. On the other hand, the width of the bin should be large
enough so that multiple measurements of a same PUF should always
fall into the same bin. In other words, the width of the bin should be
larger than the variation of the intra-chip measurement distribution.
Therefore, the choice of inspection bit is a tradeoff between inter-
FHD and intra-FHD for a PUF with asymmetric routing.
Fig. 5. For an asymmetrically routed PUF with proper inspection bit, roughly
half of the difference values across all chips would fall in bin 1, therefore
the inter-FHD would be close to 50%.
IV. INSPECTION BIT IDENTIFICATION
A. Intra-FHD Prediction Model
The intra-FHD depends on the width of the bins w = 2i when
the inspection bit is biti. A straightforward way to determine the
associated intra-FHD for each inspection location is to gather multiple
measurements of the same challenge on a same PUF, and simply
calculate the intra-FHD for each biti. A more efficient approach is
to predict the intra-FHD without calculating it for each biti.
To predict intra-FHDk of a challenge Ck of an inspection bit, we
first obtain t measured difference registers of the challenge Ck of
a same PUF. Since the bin width and the range of the difference
register is known, the t difference values can be divided into two
groups (responses) according to the bins they reside in. Let the
number of difference values fall in bin 1 be none, and number of
difference values fall in bin 0 be nzero. none and nzero represent
the number of responses of the challenge Ck to be one and zero
during the t measurements, respectively. Since the intra-FHD is
essentially calculated from the response difference between any two
measurements, the predicted intra-FHDk is calculated as:
intra-FHDk =
none × nzero(
t
2
) × 100%, (1)
where the final predicted intra-FHD would be the averaged intra-
FHDk of all challenges.
As shown in Figure 6, the expected intra-FHD1 is 0% because
all measurements fall in the same bin and none × nzero = 0. The
expected intra-FHD2 depends on the portion of measured values that
fall in bin 1. With larger bin width w, it is more likely that all
responses would fall into the same bin
B. Inter-FHD Lower Bound Prediction Model
The inter-FHD depends on the bin width w with a given inspection
bit biti. Assume the distribution of inter-chip difference value is a
Normal distribution N ∼ (µ, σ2). Define  to be the distance between
the mean µ and the closest bin boundary on the left as Figure 7
Fig. 6. Magnified view of Figure 5 with three bins. w is the bin width and the
measurement ranges for challenges C1 and C2 are specified. The expected
intra-FHD1 is 0% and the expected intra-FHD2 depends on the portion of
measured values that fall in bin 1.
shows. We first prove that the worst-case inter-FHD happens when
 = 0.5w, followed by the prediction model of the inter-FHD for the
worst-case scenario.
1) Worst-Case Inter-FHD Identification: Given a fixed w, define
A1() and A0() to be the total underlying area in bin 1 and bin 0
as functions of , respectively. For any Normal distribution, A1()
and A0() are calculated as:
A1() =
∞∑
n=−∞
F (−+ 2nw + w)− F (−+ 2nw) (2)
A0() = 1−A1(, w) (3)
where F (·) is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the
Normal distribution, and n is the index for bin area summation.
The ratio Ratio() is defined as:
Ratio() =
A1()
A0()
, 0 <  < w (4)
where the range of  is from 0 to w because of its periodic structure.
The closer the Ratio() is to one, the closer the inter-FHD would
be to 50% because the two areas are closer to each other. We want
to show that the largest (most unbalanced) ratio happens at  = 0.5w
as Figure 7 shows.
To find the extreme value of Ratio() given a fixed w, we take
derivative with respective to  of Equation 4 and replace A0() by
1−A1() from Equation 3:
d
d
Ratio() =
A′1()
(1−A1())2 (5)
From Equation 5 we see that to find the extreme value of Ratio(),
it is equivalent to find the solution of A′1(), which is given below:
d
d
A1() =
∞∑
n=−∞
f(−+ 2nw + w)− f(−+ 2nw) (6)
where f(·) is the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the Normal
distribution. Equation 6 shows that A′1() is the summation of
differences between two PDF terms where one is a shifted version
by w of another. Therefore, applying  = 0.5w to Equation 6, we get
a zero. Figure 7 shows that when  = 0.5w, each difference term in
Equation 6 has its counter part at the mirrored location to the center,
so that the summation becomes zero.
To conclude our derivation, given a w of an inspection bit, the
extreme value of Ratio() happens when  = 0.5w, and the inter-
chip stander deviation σ is needed for the Ratio() calculation.
2) Inter-FHD Lower Bound Prediction: To predict inter-FHD,
we calculate the probability of which any pair of chips produce
different responses. The inter-FHD prediction given the width w of
the inspection bit is:
inter-FHD =
2Ratio()
(1 +Ratio())2
(7)
Fig. 7. Worst Inter-FHD happens when the mean is at the middle of a bin.
With Ratio() = 1, the two areas are the same, resulting
a predicted 50% inter-FHD. Given a selected bit i, plugging in
 = 0.5w to Equation 7 would give the predicted inter-FHD lower
bound.
Please note that to predict inter-FHD, the inter-chip standard
deviation σ is needed because the calculation involves the CDF.
However, the mean µ does not affect the prediction because the
extreme value is obtained by finding the worst-case . Also, since
changing the inspection bit results at least a 2x change of w, the
inter-chip σ does not have to be calculated with high accuracy. It can
be obtained by pre-layout simulation or measuring a small number
of chips.
C. Inspection Bit Selection
Given the Error Correction Code (ECC) specification correspond-
ing to the PUF design, the intra-FHD threshold can be defined.
From the intra-FHD prediction model, choose a set of candidate bits
that would satisfy the intra-FHD threshold requirement. From the
candidate bits, a best inspection bit can be determined by applying
the inter-FHD prediction model given the standard deviation σ of the
inter-chip delay distribution.
Please note that only one chip is needed for the inspection bit
selection since the measurement noise is similar for all chips from
our experiment and the σ is obtained from pre-layout simulation. The
location of the final inspection bit, which is a public information, is
passed to all PUFs for the secret response generation.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Strong UNBIAS PUF Implementation
The strong UNBIAS PUF structure is implemented on 7 Altera
DE2-115 FPGA boards. In our implementation, no physical con-
straints, additional XORs, tunable delay units, or any systematic
variation compensation techniques are used. The design is purely
a RTL design.
The ROs inserted between path configurations are composed of
19 inverters, and the signal will be propagated to the next path
configuration when the RO counter associated to the RO reaches a
count of 50 thousand. The UNBIAS PUF has 10 path configurations,
therefore the length of the challenge is 10-bit long. The length of
the difference register is 19-bit, and the length of the final response
for each challenge is one bit. For our experiment, 120 challenges are
applied, and 120 bits of responses are obtained for each PUF within
a second. Please note that the RO structure and the count of the RO
counter are selected given the 50 MHz system clock of the FPGA.
The results are similar as long as no overflow occurs at the 19-bit
difference register.
B. Prediction Model Validation
The inter-FHD is obtained from 7 FPGAs, and the intra-FHD
is calculated by measuring each PUF 10 times. To show inter-
chip variation and measurement noise of our experimental setup, we
measure the frequency of a single RO across the chips 10 times, and
the inter-chip variation is 6.1% with 0.2% measurement noise.
To validate the intra-FHD prediction model, we follow the proce-
dure described in Section IV-A with t = 10 measurements. Figure 8
shows the results of the intra-FHD prediction of bit5 and bit10. The
intra-FHD of bit5 is much higher than bit10 because its bin width is
much smaller.
Fig. 8. Strong UNBIAS PUF intra-FHD predictions of bit5 and bit10 of 7
FPGAs. bit5 has much larger intra-FHD because its bin width is smaller.
To validate the inter-FHD prediction model, for each challenge,
we obtain an inter-chip standard deviation σ from 7 FPGAs, and
the final σ used in the prediction model is the median of the σ
from 120 challenges, which gives σ = 521. The results shown in
Figure 9 indicate that the inter-FHD lower bound prediction is well
matched with the measured data. To demonstrate that the inter-FHD
prediction model does not require an accurate inter-chip σ estimation,
Figure 9 also shows the prediction range with σ ± 15% variation.
We can see that the differences of the predictions are limited, which
indicates that the σ can either be obtained from pre-layout simulation
or measurements of a small number of chips. The prediction gap
is relatively large when w is much larger than σ. However, as w
becomes comparable to σ, where potential inspection bits begin to
occur, the prediction curve rises up quickly and matches the measured
data well. Figure 9 also shows that bit10 should be a proper inspection
bit because the intra-FHD is low and the inter-FHD is close to 45%
C. Uniqueness and Reliability Evaluation
The results of inter-FHD and intra-FHD with different inspection
bit selections are shown in Figure 9. As we can see from the figure,
using bits closer to the MSB gives low intra-FHD but also low
inter-FHD. This verifies the fact that the delay paths are biased if
no physical implementation constraints are imposed. On the other
hand, using bits closer to the LSB gives 50% on both intra-FHD and
inter-FHD because of the measurement noise. As predicted, the best
inspection location appears at bit10 with 45.1% inter-FHD and 5.9%
intra-FHD. The results also indicate that the systematic variation is
mitigated because no constraints are imposed at all.
Table I shows comparison results with previous work. With con-
ventional Arbiter PUF (APUF) shown in the second column, the
results from [9] show that the circuit is essentially a constant number
generator with very little inter-FHD. The third column shows the 3-1
double Arbiter PUF with XORs [13], where symmetric layout is still
required, and the hardware overhead is 2X or 3X from the duplicated
circuits depending on the uniqueness requirement of the application.
The inter-FHD is close to 50% but the intra-FHD is high due to
the XORs. The fourth column shows the results from Path Delay
Line (PDL) PUF [6]. Symmetric PDL and delay characterization for
each CRP are required, which can cause scalability issues. Also the
Fig. 9. Inter-, intra-FHD, and inter-FHD prediction using σ = 521 with
different inspection bit selections of the strong UNBIAS PUF.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN PREVIOUS ARBITER PUFS AND STRONG
UNBIAS PUF
APUF
[9]
XOR
[13]
PDL
[6]
UNBIAS
PUF
inter-FHD 7.2% 50.6% 45.25% 45.1%
intra-FHD 0.24% 11.8% 4.1% 5.9%
Symm. Layout No Yes Yes No
Characterization No No Yes No
ability of eliminating biased responses is limited because it depends
on the number of tuning stages inserted. The last column shows the
proposed strong UNBIAS PUF. Its behavior is unique and stable, and
most importantly no symmetric layout at all.
D. Temperature and Voltage Variations
For temperature and voltage variations, the reference responses
are measured at 20◦C with standard voltage 12V. The reference
responses are then compared with responses measured at 20◦C and
75◦C with 10% voltage variation. The results indicate the reliability
of the PUF when it is enrolled at normal condition but verified at a
high temperature environment with unstable voltage source.
Figure 10 shows the intra-FHD using bit10 as the inspection bit.
All intra-FHD at 20◦C with 10% voltage variation is below 8%, and
all intra-FHD at 75◦C with 10% voltage variation is below 14%,
which is still within conventional ECC margin with error reduction
techniques for PUFs [22, 23]. Compared with RO PUF presented in
[14], one possible explanation of smaller intra-FHD for our strong
UNBIAS PUF is that with multiple RO delay units, the overall delay
variation is canceled out, where for the RO PUF, the variation of
each RO is directly compared.
Fig. 10. Strong UNBIAS PUF intra-FHD under tempreature and voltage
variations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the first strong UNBIAS PUF that can be imple-
mented purely by RTL without complex post-layout analysis or
hand-crafted physical design effort. The proposed measurement can
effectively mitigate the impact of biased delay paths and metastability
issues to extract local device randomness. The inspection bit can be
determined efficiently from the intra-FHD and inter-FHD prediction
models.
The strong UNBIAS PUF is implemented on 7 FPGAs without
imposing any physical layout constraints. Experimental results show
that the intra-FHD of the strong UNBIAS PUF is 5.9% and the inter-
FHD is 45.1%, and the prediction models are closely fitted to the
measured data. The averaged intra-FHD of the strong UNBIAS PUF
at worst temperature and voltage variations is about 12%, which is
still within the margin of conventional ECC techniques. The fact
that the proposed scheme is immune to physical implementation bias
would allow the strong UNBIAS PUF to be designed and integrated
with minimum effort in a high-level description of the design, such
as during RTL design.
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